As many in the blogosphere already know, the Phillies have supposedly kicked the tires on one Donald Zackary Greinke. CSN’s Jim Salisbury first reported it here. For the price of your entire farm system, you could have a right-handed version of Cole Hamels.

My fears with Greinke is that due to his past history, he’ll turn into Brendan Fraser’s character in “The Scout” and climb up onto the roof of CBP during the World Series.

Yup.

All kidding aside, I do appreciate Ruben’s enthusiastic approach at bringing in talent. It’s encouraging to know that we’re not twiddling our thumbs, which is more than Ed Wade did. Haven’t heard prices from the Royals, but it’s initially thought that they would need a king’s ransom to move him (or essentially whatever is left of our farm system). Doubtful that anything serious will happen, but bravo to Ruben for at least giving it the old college try.

• Phillies trade 3 advanced prospects (and highly touted Jason Knapp) for Cliff Lee
• Phillies determine they can’t sign Cliff Lee to the kind of contract they want
• Phillies determine they CAN sign Halladay to that kind of deal
• Phillies consider trading 3 advanced prospects for Roy Halladay
• Phillies realize that would leave them with 1 advanced prospect
• Phillies need advanced prospects to be competitive in 2011 and beyond
• Phillies decide to use Cliff Lee to add 3 advanced prospects

Does everyone follow the logic? The Phillies wanted to lock up an ace to pitch in front of Cole Hamels. Cliff Lee was not that guy. Roy Halladay was. And as we saw in the payroll series, the Phillies are desperate for cost controlled talent. If you add high priced veterans to an utter dearth of advanced prospects, what you get is the Cubs or Mets. Does any fan want to watch the Phillies turn into the Cubs or Mets? I didn’t think so.

Let’s take this from Ruben’s perspective. Most fans seem to think that the General Manager’s job is to put together the best roster possible. That’s not exactly correct. A GM’s job is to make the ballclub money. The biggest weapon in the GM’s arsenal is the MLB roster. The better the roster, the more money people are willing to pay to see it play. So it is in Amaro’s best interest to field a team today that is likely to compete in the playoffs. Today’s Phillies roster is such a team, even without Cliff Lee.

Ruben also needs to worry about future revenues. Looking at what the Phillies have on paper, they MUST find some cost controlled all-star talent or else they risk being surpassed by the Braves. And as friendly as the fans are today, how long do you think they will financially support a .500ish ballclub? I’m setting the over/under at 50 games. With only Dom Brown, Kyle Kendrick, Antonio Bastardo, Drew Carpenter, and Scott Mathieson as plausible minor league contributors, it’s obvious more talent was needed. Especially since four of those names are rather fringy.

With every passing day, I’m happier with the haul we got from the Lee deal. The injuries Lee’s suffered couldn’t entirely be predicted, but he’s never been the picture of health. Tyson Gillies appears to be a very exciting player in the Shane Victorino mold. Aumont and Ramirez should both factor in at the ML level, whether or not they’re back of the rotation types or front of the bullpen fixtures is still up for interpretation. We also got $8 mil of payroll flexibility. For all that we lost 1 season of Cliff Lee and (probably) a late first and supplemental first round pick.

Cliff Lee, like it or not, was expendable. The Phillies should enjoy the same level of success in the regular season without him. Sure, they may take a 5% hit per round to their playoff chances, but if that’s the price for a competitive roster in 2011, 2012, and beyond, then I’ll take it.

Ruben's smitten!

This is the final installment of a series in which I attempt to objectively evaluate Ruben Amaro’s performance as general manager. Part I can be found here, and Part II here.

I concluded Part II with a paragraph that I probably should have saved for the end of this post. Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a “edit” function on this blog, or a “delete” key on my keyboard, so my slight error will live on in infamy. Still, when you examine Ruben’s dealings with other ballclubs, as I will today, it remains apparent that he is capable of alternating strokes of genius and mediocrity. The trades, and accompanying analysis, after the jump.

7/28/2009: Traded catcher Lou Marson, infielder Jason Donald, and pitchers Jason Knapp and Carlos Carrasco to the Indians for pitcher Cliff Lee and outfielder Ben Francisco

Like most Phillies fans, I watched with mounting and equal parts excitement and dread as Amaro and J.P. Ricciardi two-stepped together in a constantly discussed Roy Halladay trade throughout the month of July. The names being floated, or at least rumored to be, included the aforementioned players, Kyle Drabek, Michael Taylor, Domonic Brown, J.A. Happ, and Travis D’Arnaud. Which GM was trying to include which players depended on what you read, who you talked to, and where you heard it. The only thing that was clear: Blue Jays fans understandably wanted what learned men refer to as “a buttload” of prospects in return, and Phillies fans’ sphincters were tightening as they prayed that Amaro wouldn’t burn down the farm and piss on the ashes for a season and a half of one pitcher, no matter how awesome he might be.

Three days before the deadline, Amaro pulled the Lee deal out his hat. Frankly, when the terms of the deal were first leaked, I didn’t believe them. I wanted to, but I couldn’t. How could Lee, the reigning American League Cy Young, be obtained for such a pittance, compared to the ridiculous package the Jays were demanding for Doc? After weeks of the Phillies’ faithful going to bed each night, praying that Amaro wouldn’t give up Drabek, Brown and Taylor, he managed to get a similarly talented pitcher without giving up any of them.

What did he give up? Evaluating prospect-heavy deals is more complex than those which are comprised solely of established quantities, simply because a prospect’s ultimate value is still uncertain. Beyond the Boxscore’s Sky Kalkman broke down what could be considered fair return for a frontline starter (specifically, Halladay) here, based on Victor Wang’s research on prospect values. You can access Wang’s article for The Hardball Times through that link, but unless you want to plunge deep into the icy waters of math, here’s the gist: A prospect’s inherent value isn’t solely how well he performs once he reaches the big leagues, but the fact that he is cost-controlled for his first six seasons. Of course, performance plays a big part in it, and much of the hardcore numbers-crunching Wang does is attempting to quantify all outcomes (bust, contributor, regular, star, and everything in between). But the reason prospects are so highly regarded is that, if they pan out, teams get to pay them way below what a free agent who produces similar results would command on the open market. The best player to start a franchise with today would be Evan Longoria, not just because he’s all-around awesome at baseball, or he’s young, or he plays third base, but because his contract is insanely team-friendly.  He’s making $950,000 this year. Lance fucking Cormier is making more than him right now. If the Rays exercise all his options – and they will, barring catastrophe – his first three free agent seasons will have been bought out and he’ll have made $44.5 million in nine seasons. For comparison’s sake, A-Rod has already made $59 million, two seasons into his deal with the Yankees. Assuming Longoria continues to be worth between 5-7 WAR per season, the Rays will be paying him less than a million bucks per marginal win. To paraphrase Gwen Stefani, this shit is bananas. True, most players won’t sign contracts like that, but they’re still getting paid a lot less than they could on the open market. Tim Lincecum just signed a two-year, $23 million deal after winning consecutive NL Cy Youngs, and that was a record AAV for a player with his service time. What kind of deal do you think Lil’ Tim could’ve gotten in free agency?

Probably enough to buy about a billion more piles.

Anyway, you get the point. Back to the matter at hand. What Amaro gave up for Lee was a classic “quantity over quality” deal. Marson and Donald were and are viewed as probable reserves, Carrasco as a back-end starter unless things click, and Knapp, while talented, is still years away and was nursing a shoulder injury at the time of the deal. None of them were premium value guys, with the possible exception of Knapp. Unless all four guys meet or exceed their ceilings, Amaro will have paid pennies on the dollar for Lee. Not to mention the oft-overlooked value of Francisco, a more than adequate fourth outfielder who is capable of starting for long stretches if need be and is under team control for the next few seasons.

After the Ibanez signings and other moves in his first winter at the helm, my confidence in Amaro was rather low. The lead-up to and execution of this deal ratcheted it up several notches. Here was the patience, the restraint that makes a good to great general manager. Amaro handled his first deadline fracas impeccably, refusing to give in to Toronto’s lofty demands and finding not merely a fair deal for a sorely needed ace, but a bargain.

12/16/09: Traded pitcher Kyle Drabek, outfielder Michael Taylor and catcher Travis D’Arnaud to the Blue Jays for pitcher Roy Halladay

12/16/09: Traded pitcher Cliff Lee to the Mariners for outfielder Tyson Gillies and pitchers Phillippe Aumont and J.C. Ramirez

Once again, when news broke of a possible three team deal with the Jays and Mariners centered around Lee and Halladay, there was a ton of confusion in the media as to who was going where, but one thing became clear early on: Phillies fans salivating over the prospect of having three aces, a Cerberus that would terrorize baseball all summer and deep into October, were going to be disappointed. Nobody was quite sure about the other details, but this we knew: Halladay was coming in. Lee was leaving.

Credit: Tug Haines, TheFightins

We’d all fallen in love with Lee in the preceding few months, from his initial dominance of the NL after the trade to a postseason perhaps even more brilliant than Cole Hamels’ run in 2008. His CGBS (complete game bitch slap) of the Yankees in Game 1 of the World Series, complete with not one, but two “did he really just do that?” defensive plays, is one of my all-time favorite games. So while getting Doc was a thrill, it was definitely bittersweet knowing that Lee wouldn’t be pitching in red pinstripes anymore. Lee, for his part, seemed pretty bummed about it, too, and confessed to being “shocked.”

Sentimentality aside, as the particulars began to emerge, I was decidedly unhappy with what had transpired. I understood the idea behind the pair of deals. In the view of the front office, there was simply no way an extension with Lee could be worked out, so Amaro went back to the object of his affection, Halladay. Getting an extension done was a prerequisite, and Halladay took a much shorter deal than he probably could have gotten as a free agent, so the Phillies’ organizational policy on shorter-term deals was observed to good effect. And after making trades for not one, but two recent Cy Young winners, the farm was in dire need of restocking. Cost-controlled talent is going to be vital to the team’s success – and by extension, Amaro’s  job security – over the next couple years, and this deal demonstrated his awareness of that. My displeasure stemmed from the execution, not the idea itself.

Was this really the best we could have gotten for Lee? It didn’t seem like it, at first. It felt a lot more like the deal with Cleveland, except with us getting the short end this time. The media and fan reactions echoed these sentiments, though most were still too fixated on the allure of having Lee, Halladay and Hamels in the same rotation. Would that have been awesome? Of course. There’s not a doubt in my mind that Hamels will bounce back this season, and with those three, backed by our offense, there’s no question we would have rightfully been the odds-on favorites for our second World Fucking Championship in three years. But where would we have been after this season? A severely weakened farm, an aging core, and a huge, gaping hole in the rotation where Lee used to be. Not exactly in position to run shit in the NL East for a decade or more, Braves-style, which should be the goal. Not only are the playoffs a crapshoot where the best team rarely wins, all three guys would have had to get through the season in one piece, which is far from a given, despite their lack of worrisome injury histories.

I still wish we had gotten a better haul (Carlos Triunfel would have been awesome), but my opinion of the package we got is slowly rising. Maybe that’s just me being hopeful. I can’t say for sure. I do think that Gillies has a good shot at developing into a quality leadoff hitter, which we haven’t had for most of my lifetime. My initial pessimism regarding Aumont’s ability to stick in the rotation has abated, though I still think Ramirez is a low-leverage bullpen arm waiting to happen. This year will tell us an awful lot about all three guys. It may yet turn out that Amaro got the better of this deal, particularly since Seattle is almost definitely not going to be able to keep Lee after this season. A few delusional Phillies fans are crossing their fingers that we’ll sign him back, and while that would really make the trade a win for us, it ain’t gonna happen. We’re hamstrung in 2011 as it is without trying to fit another $20 million or so into the equation. Plus, Lee’s almost definitely going to get offers of five or more years.

As for what we gave up for Halladay, it’s important to keep in mind that we got four (potentially five) years of Doc for those prospects, not a seaason and a half. So, while it stung to lose both Drabek and Taylor in the same deal, it was an acceptable loss. If Drabek, D’Arnaud or Brett Wallace (whom the Jays traded Taylor for almost immediately) pan out, the Jays got a nice haul for their ace. It certainly wasn’t anywhere close to the rape job Amaro pulled on the Indians, that’s for sure.

So, as we come to the end of this long-winded evaluation of Ruben Amaro, Jr., what conclusions can be drawn? Amaro has shown a knack for avoiding arbitration with fair or team-friendly contracts. He’s shown that he can be rather single-minded and aggressive in his pursuit of players he’s targeted, which is a double-edged sword. He’s shown an unfortunate tendency to overpay, in money and years, for fungible assets. He’s shown a reluctance, or refusal, to take a calculated risk and allow the market to develop in hopes of getting a better deal in free agenct. Ultimately, what you get is a GM who falls squarely in the middle tier. His flashes of brilliance aren’t enough to put him among the best in the business, but his blunders aren’t egregious enough to excoriate him as the second coming of Ed Wade. Phillies fans should continue to hope that Amaro will minimize his mistakes going forward, while not being surprised if and when he does not. He may not be doing everything in the best way possible to ensure this stay on the mountaintop will last well into the decade, but we’re still bearing witness to a golden age of Phillies baseball. Let’s enjoy it as much as we can.

All bets are off if he lets Werth walk without an offer and Our Beard and Savior signs with the Yankees. In that case, I will probably be found at the front of the mob outside his office, brandishing a pitchfork and a flaming torch. I’m just sayin’.

This is the second in a three part series that attempts to objectively evaluate the performance of Ruben Amaro as general manager. For Part I, click here.

As I mentioned in my introductory post, I’m more of a harsh critic on Amaro than most Phillies fans. After all, the man is batting 1.000 in NL pennants per season at the helm, and we’re still less than five years removed from the Dark Ages of Ed Wade (hard to believe, isn’t it?). You might call me spoiled by recent success, even unappreciative. That couldn’t be further from the truth; I simply like winning and want our front office to continue putting us in the best possible position to do so for many years to come.

In Part I, I discussed Amaro’s handling of arbitration-eligible players and extensions, where the overwhelming majority of his best work has occurred, so I may not have seemed particularly critical of his performance. Today, however, I’ll be examining his forays into the free agent market, and I have some serious issues there. Read on after the jump…

12/16/08: Signed LF Raul Ibanez to a three-year, $31.5 million deal

I was taken aback when rumors surfaced that we were interested in Ibanez as a replacement for Pat Burrell. By all measurements, he was a downgrade. He was another lefty on a team that already leaned too far to the left in the middle of the order. He was a less productive hitter, and just as prone to cold streaks as Burrell ever was.  He was four years older. As bad as Pat was in the field, UZR had Ibanez as even worse. It made little sense to me, unless he was coming cheap and/or on a short-term deal. So you can imagine my anger at learning that we had given him a three-year deal in excess of $10 million per season.

This was only the tip of the iceberg. Amaro decided to give Ibanez a no-trade clause, and since Ibanez was a Type A free agent who had been offered arbitration by the Mariners, we lost our first round pick. Recall that Amaro declined to offer Burrell arbitration and thus got bubkes when he signed with the Rays. Furthermore, it became painfully apparent as weeks went by that the free agent market was so depressed that subsequent signings by players like Adam Dunn and Bobby Abreu underscored just how severely Amaro had overpaid as a result of his lack of patience and willingness to let the market develop. Just because Ibanez had a career year out of absolutely fucking nowhere doesn’t mean this was a good signing. It means we got lucky.*

The beard alone will cost $5 mil a season

*I said no hindsight would be a parameter of this evaluation, and I meant it. But the buyer’s market in free agency had been forecast by many executives and members of the press, and that needs to be taken into account. “No hindsight” also means Amaro doesn’t get praised or penalized by a player having an unexpectedly good or bad season.

Ibanez is almost certain to regress this year, and I remain concerned about 2011, when we’ll be paying him $11.5 million. My issue has always been with the third year of the deal, and it is even more of a problem now, with so much money committed next year that we may not be able to retain Jayson Werth.

1/6/09: Signed RHP Chan Ho Park to a one-year, $2.5 million deal

The consensus reaction was identical to my own: If he’s in the bullpen, fine. If he’s supposed to be our fifth starter, yikes. And the signals coming from both the team and Park himself were clear: He was here to win a job in the rotation, despite the fact that he hadn’t been an effective starter since 2001. He was coming off a solid year as a multiple-inning reliever with the Dodgers, but expecting 30 effective starts out of the guy wasn’t merely optimistic, it was unabashed foolishness.

7/15/09: Signed RHP Pedro Martinez to a one-year, $2 million deal (prorated to $950,000)

While he was never going to be an adequate substitute for Roy Halladay (whom Amaro was doggedly pursuing at the time), Pedro’s past pedigree suggested that in a shortened season, he could at least provide serviceable innings as a starter. At the time, our rotation was Hamels, Blanton, Happ, Moyer, and Rodrigo Lopez. Suffice it to say nobody was all that confident in the prospect of defending a championship with an overachieving rookie and a struggling 46 year old in the playoff rotation. Martinez was a cheap veteran addition that provided much-needed insurance in case a trade for a starter didn’t materialize, and depth if one did.

12/1/09: Signed catcher Brian Schneider to a two-year, $2.75 million deal

Certainly an upgrade over the Chris Costes and Paul Bakos of the world, but I’m not sure going more than one year or $1 million AAV on a backup catcher was all that necessary. My personal preference was Gregg Zaun,a much better hitter who signed a one-year deal for $1.9 million with a second-year option with the Brewers a few days later. For what it’s worth, Schneider ranks highly in what little can be quantified about catcher defense at this point. At the same time, his recent knee and back issues are worrisome.

12/3/09: Signed 3B Placido Polanco to a three-year, $18 million deal

Also, his mandibles of death should come in handy somewhere down the line.

Fact #1: Polanco is 34 years old. Fact #2: He hasn’t played a single inning at third base since 2005. Fact #3: His wOBA has plummeted from .371 to .339 to .321 over the last three seasons. Fact #4: The contract contains a mutual option for a fourth year. These are not good facts. I realize that there really weren’t any attractive free agents at the hot corner outside of Adrian Beltre,  but why commit three, possibly four years to a guy who hasn’t played the position in four years and might well be in decline? On the plus side, Polanco does have a couple seasons’ worth of experience at third, and he played quite well there. His BABIP was a little low for him, and moving from Comerica to CBP should provide a modest boost in offensive production. He also provides some flexibility; he could conceivably be moved to second every so often to give Chase Utley some more rest, with Greg Dobbs sliding in at third. Much like the Ibanez deal, I don’t hate the player, or the salary. Just not a fan of the years.

12/3/09: Signed infielder Juan Castro to a one-year, $750,000 deal

12/15/09: Signed 1B/OF Ross Gload to a two-year, $2.6 million deal

1/5/09: Signed RHP Danys Baez to a two-year, $5.25 million deal

I have designated these signings “W,” “T,” and “F,” respectively. I honestly have no idea why Amaro would sign any of these guys. Castro, much like his predecessor, Eric Bruntlett, can’t hit. He’s pretty solid defensively at second and short, but why guarantee him a roster spot? There are plenty of all-field, no-hit middle infielders floating around the majors. Same deal with Gload; plenty of similar players are out there, some of them languishing in the minors. Why is he getting a guaranteed, two-year deal for any amount of money above $1.5 million, total? And don’t tell me it’s because he can play the outfield. He’s Brad Hawpe-level bad. As for Baez, maybe at that point, Park was still looking for a team that would give him a shot at their rotation (not surprisingly, he found no such team), but did Amaro even attempt to contact him again with a similar offer to this one? It’s hard to believe that he wouldn’t have at least considered it at that point. Baez just isn’t worth much more than a minor-league invite or, at most, a cheap one-year deal. He doesn’t strike guys out. His control isn’t really that good. His performance last year was nothing special, even with an unsustainable .239 BABIP. What can be said for him is that in the last two seasons, he’s become an extreme groundball pitcher, though his HR/FB rate has simultaneously spiked. So, with a quality defensive infield like ours behind him, he should benefit. Still, I can’t see any justification for the contract Amaro handed him. These are all relatively minor contracts, but the little things add up. If Castro’s option is exercised, this group will be making a little over $5 million in 2011. Even with a $140 million payroll, that’s a significant number. For all the focus on the huge salaries like Ryan Howard’s and Roy Halladay’s and how they’ll affect our flexibility moving forward, small mistakes like these may be the difference between adding a significant piece or standing pat at the deadline, or signing an impact player or retread next winter to plug a hole.

1/28/09: Signed RHP Jose Contreras to a one-year, $1.5 million deal

Making the Baez signing even more puzzling was this one. Contreras is a much better pitcher than Baez, and quite possibly an upgrade over Park. His 4.16 FIP over the last two seasons, most of which came as a starter, seem to indicate that he is still a viable rotation option, unlike Park, and his recent uptick in strikeouts is likely to be more sustainable as a reliever. Finally, (small sample size alert) he pitched very well with Colorado, his first time in the National League. Despite the presence of other suitors, Amaro showed some patience and restraint in getting his man.

The problem, as you can plainly see from this analysis, is that this is much more the exception than the rule. Amaro has said that he is very much a “bird in hand” kind of guy, and apparently that is true to a fault.  It hasn’t hurt us quite yet, but there are only so many times you can get lucky before shit blows up in your face. Regardless, it’s what makes Amaro such a frustrating GM to watch work. He’ll have his shrewd, even brilliant moments, but then follow one with what is generously described as a head-scratcher. If Amaro ever learns to let the market develop a little and not waste roster spots and significant cash on flotsam, he’ll be one of the best in the business. At this point, however, it’s hard not to believe that what we’ve seen so far is what we’ll be getting for however long Amaro is running the show.

Tomorrow, in the finale, I’ll look at how Amaro’s done with trades.

Shortly after our glorious World Series victory, Pat Gillick stepped down as general manager and was replaced by Ruben Amaro. There was, understandably, some trepidation among discerning Phillies fans. Not only did this lead to long-time assistant GM and respected scouting guru Mike Arbuckle leaving the organization, but Amaro was initially under the tutelage of Ed Wade, who was by all accounts a big, stupid doo-doo head. With a season and two winters under his belt, there’s enough activity to fairly evaluate his work up to this point, and draw some conclusions about the kind of GM he is.

Today, I’ll be looking at how Amaro has handled arbitration, contract extensions, and re-signings. Going forward, my intention is to objectively evaluate Amaro’s decisions without relying on the gift of hindsight; that is to say, I’m attempting to judge the merits of transactions based on what was known at the time. It would hardly be fair to expect Amaro to know the future, after all. Analysis after the jump…

12/1/08: Declined to offer Pat Burrell, Jamie Moyer, and Rudy Seanez arbitration

My initial reaction was surprise, and disappointment. Getting draft pick compensation in return for departing free agents is an important aspect of the game, since it helps you reload your farm system. Of course, that only happens if you offer arbitration and the player declines. Obviously, Amaro wasn’t confident enough that these guys wouldn’t accept. Seanez probably would have, so even though he was Type B, I agreed with that. After some thought, I was okay with not offering arb to Burrell, either; with the grim forecast of the free agent market, he may well have elected to take a guaranteed $14-16 million for one season. But I was baffled as to why Amaro didn’t offer to Moyer. It would have been a positive outcome whether he accepted or not. If he did, we’d likely get him at $7 million or so for 2009, unless a contract was negotiated prior to arbitration. If he didn’t and he signed elsewhere, we’d have gotten two draft picks for a 46 year old pitcher.

1/7/09: Signed Moyer to a two-year, $13 million contract

After making a moderate error in not offering him arbitration, Amaro also made the mistake of giving Moyer a two-year deal. There didn’t seem to be any other suitors willing to go to a second year on our favorite geriatric hurler, so why did Amaro? I was unhappy with the second year before Moyer went out and shit the bed in the first half last season. I love Moyer. I want to see him pitch until he’s 50. I’ll always remember him taking the rubber from the pitcher’s mound after we won the Series. But sentimentality doesn’t change the fact that he’s really, really old. Going year-to-year with him was and is an immensely better idea than giving him a multi-year contract.

1/16/09: Signed Greg Dobbs to a two-year, $2.5 million extension

Dobbs was the best pinch-hitter in baseball in 2008. Of course, you have to take that with a grain of salt – specifically, a grain of salt called “sample size.” Everyone learned that lesson last year, when bad luck, injury and a small sample led to a below replacement-level season for him.  Still, his solid bat and average defense at third make him worth his salary.

1/18/09: Signed Cole Hamels to a three-year, $20.5 million extension

No-brainer here. Hamels had voiced his displeasure with his salary prior to the 2008 season, then went out and kicked the NL’s ass all season, adding one of the best postseasons by any pitcher in MLB history. He was a Super 2, and arbitration could easily have led down a rough road for the organization. Instead, Amaro got Hamels’ signature on this deal, which is almost exactly in line with the 40/60/80 arbitration model. The team was able to hold to their policy of not going beyond three years for pitchers, and Hamels can hit free agency at age 29 (the deal doesn’t cover his final arbitration season). This deal was universally praised as fair for both sides, and rightfully so.

1/20/09: Signed Ryan Madson to a three-year, $12 million extension

After Madson’s sudden increase in velocity during the playoffs, Scott Boras was making favorable comparisons to Mariano Rivera. Then, word broke that Madson had rejected a three-year offer. It seemed a foregone conclusion that Madson was gone as a free agent after 2009. The news of this rather team-friendly extension caught most of us by surprise as a result. He’s been a rock in the bullpen for most of his career, and is a valuable set-up man and emergency closer. Another nice deal for both sides.

1/22/09: Signed Jayson Werth to a two-year, $10 million extension

Arguably Gillick’s best acquisition, Werth had played his way into the starting RF job, and my heart, with a fantastic 5.3 WAR season. But with a history of injury and yet to prove he could handle a full season of starting, a short extension was prudent. This bought out Werth’s first season of free agency, and he only needed to be a league-average player to justify the money. Werth has proven that he’s one of the most complete players in all of baseball, fully deserving of my man-crush. His current deal is a ridiculous bargain, and he’s going to get paaaaiiiiid next winter by somebody. The only thing not to love about this deal is how short it is, but that’s hindsight talking.

2/8/09: Signed Ryan Howard to a three-year, $54 million extension

Howard’s situation has always been a sticky one for the Phillies. First, it was his agent requesting a trade after he spent two years tearing up the minors while stuck behind Jim Thome. Then, after his incredible 2006, the team awarded him a record amount for a player with under two years of service, but Howard wanted more. He won his first arbitration case after the 2007 season, setting a record for arbitration award. Meanwhile, his value was slipping: his OPS plummeted by 200 points from 2006 to 2008. But with his counting stats in healthy shape and another arbitration case looming, Amaro was understandably looking to get something long-term worked out. The problem is, they’re essentially paying Howard market value, or even above it, when theoretically they should be paying him 60-80% of it. The arbitrator in his first case really screwed the Phillies over with a landscape-altering decision, so you can’t really blame Amaro here. Still, all this did was guarantee Howard the amount of money he probably would’ve gotten in arbitration, anyway.

12/10/09: Declined to offer arbitration to Chan Ho Park

Unacceptable, any way you look at it. Park was a Type B free agent and pitched great for us, once we put him in the bullpen where he belonged. Another win-win situation: He accepts, you’re bringing back one of your best relievers at a decent salary; he declines (which he would have, since he wants to start) and signs elsewhere, you get a sandwich pick. He ended up signing with the Yankees, where he’ll have precisely zero chance of starting, for a bargain $1.2 million. I know we offered him much more than that initially and he declined, but why weren’t we in on him when the price dropped? Oh, right, because we blew almost $5 million on Chad Durbin and Danys fucking Baez. My distaste for this series of events will be discussed in another post.

1/21/10: Signed Joe Blanton to a three-year, $24 million extension

Blanton was due to hit free agency after this season until he signed this deal, which is a slight win for the Phillies. I’m probably a bigger Blanton fan than most, and while I don’t expect him to duplicate his excellent 2007, I think he’s capable of 3-3.5 WAR per season, especially if the rise we saw in his strikeout rate last year is legitimate. Even if he’s only slightly above average, as he’s been for most of his career, he’ll earn the contract. His salary is reasonable enough that he should fetch a decent return in a trade, if and when some young, cost-controlled talent emerges. It’s yet another market value deal on a team that already has too many of them, but ain’t nothin’ free.

1/21/10: Signed Shane Victorino to a three-year, $22 million extension

I like Shane Victorino. He’s averaged 3.5 WAR over the last three seasons, which puts him seventh among all centerfielders. So why don’t I like this deal? Three reasons. 1) Despite his obvious value, I think Vic is eminently replaceable. 2) Players with his skill set lose much of their value when their speed declines. 3) Given the current roster situation, this contract may well preclude us from extending Werth. I’d much rather pay Werth $13-15 million over the next few years than pay Victorino $7-9 million. Is this fair value? Sure. But, again, with so many market value contracts already on the payroll, we need cost certainty and control wherever we can find it. With Domonic Brown and Tyson Gillies relatively close to the majors, and guys like Anthony Gose and Domingo Santana in the lower levels, paying three outfielders eight figures probably isn’t going to happen. Unless Amaro’s planning on trading Raul Ibanez next winter (I’m crossing my fingers, but not holding my breath), Werth is probably gone. The organization could decide to weather an astronomical payroll in 2011, with almost $60 million coming off the books (Ibanez, Howard, Madson, Brad Lidge, Jimmy Rollins, Danys Baez, Brian Schneider, and Ross Gload will all be free agents), but I’m not sure how eager they’d be to do so.

1/24/10: Signed Carlos Ruiz to a three-year, $8.85 million extension

That’ll buy a hell of a lot of ice cream. Chooch is one of the better catchers in the NL. The jump in power (his ISO more than doubled from 2008) was nice, and his .780 OPS ranked third among starting NL backstops, on top of his well-regarded defense. He’s essentially a league-average player at a thin and demanding position, so the salary’s a bit of a bargain. As for the years, his age (31) is a slight concern, but we really don’t have anyone in the system who will be ready to take over for him before 2013, anyway.

So, Amaro has demonstrated a willingness to, and success in, locking up good players long-term. However, he’s been somewhat timid as far as offering arbitration is concerned, and it may have ended up costing the team draft picks. He has also overpaid slightly a few times, in years or salary. On the whole, though, he’s done pretty well for himself in this area, with only minor mistakes. His forays into the free agent market are a different story, however, and I’ll be looking at those in Part II.