This is the second in a three part series that attempts to objectively evaluate the performance of Ruben Amaro as general manager. For Part I, click here.

As I mentioned in my introductory post, I’m more of a harsh critic on Amaro than most Phillies fans. After all, the man is batting 1.000 in NL pennants per season at the helm, and we’re still less than five years removed from the Dark Ages of Ed Wade (hard to believe, isn’t it?). You might call me spoiled by recent success, even unappreciative. That couldn’t be further from the truth; I simply like winning and want our front office to continue putting us in the best possible position to do so for many years to come.

In Part I, I discussed Amaro’s handling of arbitration-eligible players and extensions, where the overwhelming majority of his best work has occurred, so I may not have seemed particularly critical of his performance. Today, however, I’ll be examining his forays into the free agent market, and I have some serious issues there. Read on after the jump…

12/16/08: Signed LF Raul Ibanez to a three-year, $31.5 million deal

I was taken aback when rumors surfaced that we were interested in Ibanez as a replacement for Pat Burrell. By all measurements, he was a downgrade. He was another lefty on a team that already leaned too far to the left in the middle of the order. He was a less productive hitter, and just as prone to cold streaks as Burrell ever was.  He was four years older. As bad as Pat was in the field, UZR had Ibanez as even worse. It made little sense to me, unless he was coming cheap and/or on a short-term deal. So you can imagine my anger at learning that we had given him a three-year deal in excess of $10 million per season.

This was only the tip of the iceberg. Amaro decided to give Ibanez a no-trade clause, and since Ibanez was a Type A free agent who had been offered arbitration by the Mariners, we lost our first round pick. Recall that Amaro declined to offer Burrell arbitration and thus got bubkes when he signed with the Rays. Furthermore, it became painfully apparent as weeks went by that the free agent market was so depressed that subsequent signings by players like Adam Dunn and Bobby Abreu underscored just how severely Amaro had overpaid as a result of his lack of patience and willingness to let the market develop. Just because Ibanez had a career year out of absolutely fucking nowhere doesn’t mean this was a good signing. It means we got lucky.*

The beard alone will cost $5 mil a season

*I said no hindsight would be a parameter of this evaluation, and I meant it. But the buyer’s market in free agency had been forecast by many executives and members of the press, and that needs to be taken into account. “No hindsight” also means Amaro doesn’t get praised or penalized by a player having an unexpectedly good or bad season.

Ibanez is almost certain to regress this year, and I remain concerned about 2011, when we’ll be paying him $11.5 million. My issue has always been with the third year of the deal, and it is even more of a problem now, with so much money committed next year that we may not be able to retain Jayson Werth.

1/6/09: Signed RHP Chan Ho Park to a one-year, $2.5 million deal

The consensus reaction was identical to my own: If he’s in the bullpen, fine. If he’s supposed to be our fifth starter, yikes. And the signals coming from both the team and Park himself were clear: He was here to win a job in the rotation, despite the fact that he hadn’t been an effective starter since 2001. He was coming off a solid year as a multiple-inning reliever with the Dodgers, but expecting 30 effective starts out of the guy wasn’t merely optimistic, it was unabashed foolishness.

7/15/09: Signed RHP Pedro Martinez to a one-year, $2 million deal (prorated to $950,000)

While he was never going to be an adequate substitute for Roy Halladay (whom Amaro was doggedly pursuing at the time), Pedro’s past pedigree suggested that in a shortened season, he could at least provide serviceable innings as a starter. At the time, our rotation was Hamels, Blanton, Happ, Moyer, and Rodrigo Lopez. Suffice it to say nobody was all that confident in the prospect of defending a championship with an overachieving rookie and a struggling 46 year old in the playoff rotation. Martinez was a cheap veteran addition that provided much-needed insurance in case a trade for a starter didn’t materialize, and depth if one did.

12/1/09: Signed catcher Brian Schneider to a two-year, $2.75 million deal

Certainly an upgrade over the Chris Costes and Paul Bakos of the world, but I’m not sure going more than one year or $1 million AAV on a backup catcher was all that necessary. My personal preference was Gregg Zaun,a much better hitter who signed a one-year deal for $1.9 million with a second-year option with the Brewers a few days later. For what it’s worth, Schneider ranks highly in what little can be quantified about catcher defense at this point. At the same time, his recent knee and back issues are worrisome.

12/3/09: Signed 3B Placido Polanco to a three-year, $18 million deal

Also, his mandibles of death should come in handy somewhere down the line.

Fact #1: Polanco is 34 years old. Fact #2: He hasn’t played a single inning at third base since 2005. Fact #3: His wOBA has plummeted from .371 to .339 to .321 over the last three seasons. Fact #4: The contract contains a mutual option for a fourth year. These are not good facts. I realize that there really weren’t any attractive free agents at the hot corner outside of Adrian Beltre,  but why commit three, possibly four years to a guy who hasn’t played the position in four years and might well be in decline? On the plus side, Polanco does have a couple seasons’ worth of experience at third, and he played quite well there. His BABIP was a little low for him, and moving from Comerica to CBP should provide a modest boost in offensive production. He also provides some flexibility; he could conceivably be moved to second every so often to give Chase Utley some more rest, with Greg Dobbs sliding in at third. Much like the Ibanez deal, I don’t hate the player, or the salary. Just not a fan of the years.

12/3/09: Signed infielder Juan Castro to a one-year, $750,000 deal

12/15/09: Signed 1B/OF Ross Gload to a two-year, $2.6 million deal

1/5/09: Signed RHP Danys Baez to a two-year, $5.25 million deal

I have designated these signings “W,” “T,” and “F,” respectively. I honestly have no idea why Amaro would sign any of these guys. Castro, much like his predecessor, Eric Bruntlett, can’t hit. He’s pretty solid defensively at second and short, but why guarantee him a roster spot? There are plenty of all-field, no-hit middle infielders floating around the majors. Same deal with Gload; plenty of similar players are out there, some of them languishing in the minors. Why is he getting a guaranteed, two-year deal for any amount of money above $1.5 million, total? And don’t tell me it’s because he can play the outfield. He’s Brad Hawpe-level bad. As for Baez, maybe at that point, Park was still looking for a team that would give him a shot at their rotation (not surprisingly, he found no such team), but did Amaro even attempt to contact him again with a similar offer to this one? It’s hard to believe that he wouldn’t have at least considered it at that point. Baez just isn’t worth much more than a minor-league invite or, at most, a cheap one-year deal. He doesn’t strike guys out. His control isn’t really that good. His performance last year was nothing special, even with an unsustainable .239 BABIP. What can be said for him is that in the last two seasons, he’s become an extreme groundball pitcher, though his HR/FB rate has simultaneously spiked. So, with a quality defensive infield like ours behind him, he should benefit. Still, I can’t see any justification for the contract Amaro handed him. These are all relatively minor contracts, but the little things add up. If Castro’s option is exercised, this group will be making a little over $5 million in 2011. Even with a $140 million payroll, that’s a significant number. For all the focus on the huge salaries like Ryan Howard’s and Roy Halladay’s and how they’ll affect our flexibility moving forward, small mistakes like these may be the difference between adding a significant piece or standing pat at the deadline, or signing an impact player or retread next winter to plug a hole.

1/28/09: Signed RHP Jose Contreras to a one-year, $1.5 million deal

Making the Baez signing even more puzzling was this one. Contreras is a much better pitcher than Baez, and quite possibly an upgrade over Park. His 4.16 FIP over the last two seasons, most of which came as a starter, seem to indicate that he is still a viable rotation option, unlike Park, and his recent uptick in strikeouts is likely to be more sustainable as a reliever. Finally, (small sample size alert) he pitched very well with Colorado, his first time in the National League. Despite the presence of other suitors, Amaro showed some patience and restraint in getting his man.

The problem, as you can plainly see from this analysis, is that this is much more the exception than the rule. Amaro has said that he is very much a “bird in hand” kind of guy, and apparently that is true to a fault.  It hasn’t hurt us quite yet, but there are only so many times you can get lucky before shit blows up in your face. Regardless, it’s what makes Amaro such a frustrating GM to watch work. He’ll have his shrewd, even brilliant moments, but then follow one with what is generously described as a head-scratcher. If Amaro ever learns to let the market develop a little and not waste roster spots and significant cash on flotsam, he’ll be one of the best in the business. At this point, however, it’s hard not to believe that what we’ve seen so far is what we’ll be getting for however long Amaro is running the show.

Tomorrow, in the finale, I’ll look at how Amaro’s done with trades.

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